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Abstract
This project will attempt to determine whether or not capital punishment, in the manner which it is currently
used here in the United States, does in fact have a significant deterrent effect on the murder rates across the
country. My hypothesis is that such a deterrent effect does exist and that, as the likelihood of being executed
increases that deterrent effect will become stronger.
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The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment
Adam Law
I. Introduction
The United States’ continued use of capital punishment has 
been a source of debate for years. According to Amnesty 
International, the United States is one of only 58 nations that 
still actively employ capital punishment. Last year 52 people 
were executed in the United States, the fifth most worldwide, 
fewer than only China, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (www.
amnesty.org). The use of capital punishment in the United 
States was temporarily suspended from 1972 to 1976, as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case Furman 
v. Georgia, where it was ruled to be a “cruel and unusual 
punishment” in certain cases and thus unconstitutional. 
However, since its reinstitution, 1,233 people have been 
executed, with the most recent being the November 4th 
execution of an Alabama man for the murder of his pregnant 
teenage daughter’s boyfriend, and 3,256 currently sit on death 
row (Death Penalty Information Center). All but one of those 
3,256 currently on death row are there for murder, the exception 
being a Georgia man sentenced to death for kidnapping with 
bodily injury. Currently 37 states and the federal government 
still have statutes permitting capital punishment.
Regardless of the moral and ethical issues surrounding the 
continued use of capital punishment here in the United States, 
issues which I will, by and large, attempt to avoid in this paper, 
a determination needs to be made as to whether or not capital 
punishment is serving its intended purpose, namely deterring 
people from committing certain capital punishment eligible 
crimes. If no significant deterrent effect exists it would appear 
to make more sense to instead move to a system which would 
make lifetime incarceration the maximum penalty instead of 
the death penalty. Making such a switch would save California, 
with 697 people on death row, over 100 million dollars a 
year, according to a report by the Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice, released in 2008 (www.ccfaj.org). The 
disparity in costs between the two options is due in part to the 
complicated nature of capital punishment eligible cases. Each 
capital punishment eligible trial is actually two trials; one to 
determine guilt or innocence and a second trial if the defendant 
is found guilty to determine whether or not the death penalty 
should be given. Additionally there are numerous, automatic 
appeals which must be undertaken as well which cause the 
trials to last much longer than non-capital punishment cases 
(www.deathpenalty.org). With the current state of the economy, 
across the United States and in California in particular, savings 
in the hundreds of millions are hard to ignore. 
While there are several crimes other than murder which can 
result in the death penalty, the last person to be executed for 
any crime other than murder in the United States was a man 
executed for robbery in Alabama in 1964. For that reason, I 
have chosen to only look at the effect of capital punishment 
on murder rates and exclude the case of the Georgia man on 
death row for kidnapping with bodily harm. 
This project will attempt to determine whether or not capital 
punishment, in the manner which it is currently used here in the 
United States, does in fact have a significant deterrent effect on 
the murder rates across the country. My hypothesis is that such 
a deterrent effect does exist and that, as the likelihood of being 
executed increases that deterrent effect will become stronger.
II. Theory and Literature Review 
My paper will employ Gary Becker’s “Rational Choice Theory” 
which states that every person, criminals included, undertakes 
a cost-benefit analysis before engaging in any action (Becker 
1968). As it relates to crime, he theorizes that criminals weigh 
the expected personal benefits that are perceived to come from 
committing a crime against the possible costs that may come 
their way if they are apprehended for committing that crime. In 
the specific case of murder, a potential murderer would have to 
weigh the personal benefits of things like revenge or monetary 
gain against the disutility of the shame of being convicted, the 
legal expenses, lost potential earnings, prison time, and early 
death which could occur if apprehended. Obviously, at a certain 
point, committing a crime would not pay at the margin so the 
challenge for society, according to Becker, is to figure out the 
most efficient manner of increasing the costs of committing 
said crime to that point. Proponents of capital punishment claim 
that it accomplishes exactly that. Economic studies on the 
subject as a whole unfortunately have been unable to reach a 
consensus on the existence of the purported deterrent effect.  
This inability to reach a consensus is interesting to note as 
often it is only minute changes in the overall models which 
create drastically different results. Some papers have even 
found the presence of what they call a “Brutalization” effect, 
whereby each execution actually raises the overall murder rate. 
According to this theory, by executing an individual society 
sends the message that it is acceptable to kill under certain 
circumstances. Those who tout this theory point to the increase 
in homicides that often follow an execution in the area where 
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the individual was put to death (Bowers and Pierce 1980).  
Many other contrasting works have been done by Dezhbakhsh, 
Rubin, and Shepherd however, who have consistently found 
that a significant deterrent effect does exist, and conversely, 
Donohue and Wolfers who have consistently found no deterrent 
effect (Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 2003 and 2006 and 
Donohue and Wolfers 2005 and 2006).
One such 2003 work by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 
looked at county-level data from 3,054 counties over the 
period 1977 through 1996 in order to determine if such a 
deterrent effect exists. At the time of its publication it was widely 
considered to be the most detailed and comprehensive data set 
ever compiled to test the deterrent effect of capital punishment 
in this country. Their model estimated the murder rate as a 
function of three main deterrence variables and numerous 
other control variables to account for the differences between 
counties. Their deterrence variables were: the probability 
of being arrested for committing a murder, the probability of 
receiving a death sentence conditional on being arrested, and 
the probability of being executed conditional on receiving a 
death sentence. Additionally, their control variables included 
demographic variables to account for population subsamples 
which were deemed likely to contribute to higher levels of crime 
as well as income variables with the same goal in mind. These 
variables included: the population proportion of 10-19 year 
olds and 20-29 year olds, the percentage of African Americans, 
percentages of non-African American minorities, population 
density, male population share, real per capita income, real 
per capita income maintenance payments, and real per capita 
unemployment insurance payments. Lastly, they included 
the percentage of National Rifle Association membership in 
an attempt to measure the ease of access to firearms and a 
measure of partisan influence determined by the percentage 
of the population who voted Republican in the most recent 
elections. The inclusion of all of these variables was an attempt 
to account for the varying opportunity costs for crime across the 
data set, a necessary determination to make under Becker’s 
theory. 
They then estimated 55 slightly different models, using two 
stage least squares, double-log and semi-log functions, 
producing several different results, though the estimate they 
put their most faith in, their “most conservative estimate” is 
that each execution saves on average the lives of 18 potential 
victims, with a standard deviation of 10 (Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, 
and Shepherd 2003).
These three men built on that paper in a 2006 work which 
looked at panel data from all fifty states during the period of 
1960-2000, choosing to include the four year moratorium on 
the death penalty. Using many of the same variables they 
estimated 84 distinct regression models, finding once again that 
a significant deterrent effect was present and additionally noting 
that murder rates increased substantially during the 1972-1976 
moratorium (Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 2006).
 
Two of the main opponents of capital punishment, Donohue 
and Wolfers, argue in a 2005 work that often researchers 
involved in the capital punishment debate manipulate their 
data until they reach their desired conclusion. They argue that 
while the underlying argument for the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment, “raise the price of murder for criminals, and you will 
get less of it”, makes sense, individuals given death sentences 
are so rarely executed that it may in fact be having the opposite 
effect (Donohue and Wolfers 2005). Remarkably they note that 
at the time of their study, “the execution rate on death row is 
only twice the death rate from accidents and violence among all 
American men” (Donohue and Wolfers 2005). 
In this work they look at several major studies looking at the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment, the most notable being 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s study using 1960-2000 
data, and manipulate a few variables to show how easily 
the opposite conclusion can be reached. In the case of 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd’s work they run the same 
regressions but define the likelihood of execution in three 
different ways: executions per 100,000 residents, executions 
per 1,000 prisoners, and executions per homicide. They find 
that each execution saves 7.4, -0.1, and 5.0 lives respectively 
(Donohue and Wolfers 2005). 
Following Becker’s “Rational Choice Theory” I will attempt to 
measure whether or not certain key deterrence variables do in 
fact increase the cost of committing a murder. If his theory holds 
true increasing the costs of committing a murder should result in 
a decreased likelihood of murder. The studies which I reviewed 
point to several specific variables which appear to be linked to 
determining both the cost and prevalence of murder and thus I 
will include many of the same variables in my study. 
III. Empirical Model and Data
For the most part my empirical model will follow the work done 
by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd, however, for ease I will 
attempt to use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) where they use 
two, and at times even three, stage least square regression 
techniques. For the purpose of this paper I will be looking 
at state-level cross sectional data from 2007 and 2008, the 
most recent two year period from which all the necessary data 
are available. I have chosen to use cross sectional data as 
numerous studies have detailed the benefits of using cross 
sectional data rather than time-series data. The deterrent 
effect of each execution should only affect the state in which 
the execution is carried out in and cross sectional studies 
allow for this effect to be correctly measured. I will not be 
excluding either Texas or California as has been done in some 
studies which considered them as outliers. Texas has often 
been excluded due to the relatively high number of executions 
they perform and California has been excluded as they have 
a relatively high number of people on death row but rarely 
execute anyone. I will however, include a dummy variable, 
2008, to account for changes between the two years which 
might otherwise go unrepresented. The variables I will be using 
along with their expected signs are listed in Table 1.
The main variables I am interested in are listed as “Deterrent 
Variables” in the table. If there is in fact a significant 
deterrent effect that comes from capital punishment as the 
probability of each of those factors increases there should 
be a corresponding decrease in the murder rate. This follows 
logically from Becker’s theory in all three cases as rational 
people want to avoid being arrested, given a death sentence, 
and eventually being executed. As it becomes more likely 
for each of those events to happen the “cost” of committing 
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a murder should rise until it reaches the point where criminal 
no longer find it in their best interests to commit a murder. If 
this level has been reached, these factors should be having 
a significant effect on reducing murder rates. As a result 
it seems logical to expect that each of those variables will 
have a negative coefficient. The other socioeconomic control 
variables more than likely do affect the annual murder rates 
but their inclusion is only intended to account for differences 
between states. States with higher levels of unemployment 
should naturally have higher rates of murder and other violent 
crimes as their opportunity costs of committing such acts are 
much lower for individuals without steady employment. The last 
variable, the number of law enforcement officials per capita, 
could even be grouped with the deterrence variables since as 
the number of law enforcement officials increases potential 
criminals would logically be less likely to commit murders; thus 
I expect it will have a negative coefficient. However, I have 
chosen not to include it as such as I believe it influences the 
murder rate by increasing the cost of committing a murder in 
a different manner than in measured by the likelihood of being 
arrested for a murder. 
Both the state by state murder rates and the corresponding 
arrest rates are from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Uniform Crime Reports (FBI’s UCR hereafter); yearly 
breakdowns of all crimes committed within the United States. 
This data set is not ideal for my study but it is the best and most 
complete I have been able to find. The number of deaths which 
were officially categorized as murders at year end for each state 
is reported in that year’s corresponding UCR. The obvious flaw 
with this measure is that not all deaths are correctly reported 
and there is the possibility for under or over reporting of 
numbers based on later revisions which I am unable to account 
for. The official measure I will be using for homicide arrests in 
a given state is reported in the arrest subcategory “Murders 
and nonnegligent manslaughter”. The obvious issues with 
this measure are that multiple people can be arrested for one 
murder and that they are not necessarily arrested in the same 
year the murder is committed (www.fbi.gov).  
Conviction data are not available, as the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics no longer collects such data. However, as appears 
to be the generally accepted alternative, I will be using 
sentencing data which is readily available. The data for the 
number of Americans given death sentences and eventually 
executed comes from the Department of Justice’s Bureau of 
Justice Statistics’ annual “Capital Punishment Statistics Tables” 
(http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/). These reports include state-by-state 
information on the movement of prisoners into and out of death 
row annually. To account for changes from state to state I am 
also including the state-level unemployment rates and the law 
enforcement officials per capita. Those two control variables are 
provided by the United States Census Bureau (www.census.
gov).
It is important to note here that the likelihood of each deterrent 
variable occurring is measured independently along the way. 
While not completely representative I am calculating the 
likelihood of being arrested as the number of homicide arrests 
in each year over the number of murders in that same period 
and the other two in a similar manner. While it is indeed very 
likely that the individuals getting arrested committed their crimes 
in past years this appears to be the only way of measuring what 
I need to cover my time period. 
The most obvious shortcoming of this study is the relatively few 
number of years from which I will be using data from. Unlike 
in most studies, I am unable to follow an individual from the 
time he/she commits a murder, is arrested, sentenced, and 
ultimately executed. The average stay of an inmate on death 
row, not counting the time that passes during their trial, is over 
twelve years, making it impossible to follow individual cases 
in this study. As a result of this, the results are not wholly 
representative, something which can only be remedied by 
lengthening the time period from which data are collected.   
Formally, the murder rate regression model I will be using is:
Murders/Pop= b1 + b2 Ratio of Arrests to Homicides + b3 
Ratio of Death Sentences to HomicideArrests + b4 Ratio of 
Executions to Death Sentences + b5 Unemployment + b6 
LEPerCap + b7 2008 + e. 
Support for my hypothesis should manifest itself through 
strongly significant results for B2, B3, and B4, all three of which 
should have negative coefficients.   
IV. Results 
In the end I found that no significant deterrent effect exists from 
capital punishment in this country, at least within the constraints 
of my study. As depicted in Table A, only one of the three 
deterrent variables was ever significant, and only then in the 
absence of the control variables at the .1 significance level.
I ultimately ran three different regressions: one with only the 
deterrent variables, one with the deterrent variables and the 
dummy variable for 2008, and one with all of my variables. 
A Durbin-Watson test was run for all three regressions but 
none of the three showed signs of auto-correlation. The third 
regression which included all of my variables actually produced 
a fairly decent adjusted R², explaining 32.9% of the changes in 
murder rates per capita. In that regression the unemployment 
rate and the law enforcement officials per capita accounted for 
virtually all of the changes though. Those two variables had 
coefficients of 59.831 and -.020 with standard errors of 18.477 
and .003 respectively. Both signs were as expected and the 
standard errors are small relative to the size of the coefficients. 
What those coefficients mean is that in Illinois in 2007, for 
example, the regression predicts that a .1% decrease in the 
unemployment rate from 5.1% to 5.0% would equate to roughly 
7 less murders, with everything else held constant. Similarly, 
for the same state and year, were 463 more law enforcement 
officials hired, bringing the number of law enforcement officials 
up to 54,000 from 53,537, a per capita change of roughly 2 
officers, the number of estimated murders would fall by 5.      
The fact that the Arrests/Homicide variable was not more 
significant in all models came as a surprise. I expected that 
variable to have a fairly strong effect, even if only for the fact 
that murderers were being taken off the street, not accounting 
for a deterrent effect. However, when I took a step back and 
analyzed the likelihood of each deterrent event occurring the 
results made more sense. On average, over the course of 2007 
and 2008, an individual who committed a murder, assuming 
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that each murder was committed by only one individual and 
no one was wrongly arrested, had a 71.9% chance of being 
arrested for their crime. Once arrested though their likelihood 
of receiving the death penalty fell to an astonishing average of 
only 1%. Furthermore, those individuals on death row during 
the period in question had only a 1% chance of being executed 
as well. Taken as a whole, this equates to a .00719% chance of 
being executed after committing a murder. With the likelihood of 
the latter two events occurring so low, finding no deterrent effect 
from capital punishment seems to be the logical result.  
I did choose to include states without the death penalty in the 
regressions, as the literature suggests is the norm. Due to this, 
those thirty-seven states were included in the data set with 
entries of 0 in all the death penalty related columns. Neither the 
federal government nor the District of Columbia were included 
in any manner in this study however.
There were present a few issues which may have negatively 
affected this project and skewed the results. The biggest issue 
may have been that the number of years I chose to look at 
proved to be simply too small. While I must admit that including 
more years would likely have improved this study I do not think 
that my decision to only use data from two years proved to be 
a major shortcoming. One issue which may have contributed to 
the lack of significance for the three deterrent variables was the 
manner in which the data were defined by the FBI. I was able 
to find state level, and even county level, data on the numbers 
of murders committed per year as well as the number of arrests 
for “murder and non-negligent manslaughter” in a specified 
year. However, not every murder arrest was for a murder 
committed in the same year. Additionally not every person given 
a death sentence was arrested or committed a murder in that 
same calendar year; the same holding true with those executed 
in either year. As a result of this discrepancy five states reported 
more homicide arrests than homicides in 2007 and eight states 
did so in 2008.
Taken as a whole, my results were much more consistent 
with the work of Donohue and Wolfers than with the work of 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepard. I found very little evidence 
of the existence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment, 
though as Donohue and Wolfers suggest I may have found 
drastically different results if I would have defined my variables 
differently or employed different regression techniques 
(Donohue and Wolfers 2005).
V. Conclusions
This paper presents a rather limited look into the debate on the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment. My data looked at a very 
short time period and as a result cannot be used to comment on 
the existence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment over 
the long-term. However, similar to the argument presented by 
Donohue and Wolfers, it appears that since executions are so 
rarely carried out capital punishment carries no real deterrent 
effect (Donohue and Wolfers 2005). Whether or not these 
results support Becker’s “rational choice” theory is another 
matter. On one hand the argument could be made that these 
results suggest that his theory is not applicable to murder as it 
is often a crime of passion and as such a murder performs no 
cost-benefit analysis beforehand. The relatively complete lack 
of significance of any of the deterrent variables could be used 
to support this stance. However, on the other hand most death 
penalty eligible murders are pre-meditated. A person committing 
a crime such as that surely would weigh the prospect of being 
executed for committing their crime before doing so. In that 
instance what this study would suggest is that because of the 
infrequency of executions in this country, as well as the extreme 
length of the time from a person actually committing a murder to 
being executed, the cost of committing a murder has not been 
increased to the point whereby capital punishment has any 
meaningful deterrent effect. However, the high significance of 
the law enforcement officials per capita variable does suggest 
that as more police officers and law enforcement officials are 
present the likelihood of a murder occurring does fall. This 
would appear to offer support for Becker’s theory as having 
more law enforcement officials present surely raises the cost 
of committing a murder as one becomes more likely to be 
caught before or during the act and stopped before committing 
a murder. This finding, while providing no support for the 
existence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment, does 
suggest that criminals and potential murderers are rational 
thinkers as they opt not to commit murders in areas with high 
concentrations of law enforcement officials.       
Ultimately this project found that under the current system of 
capital punishment in use in the United States its existence has 
no real deterrent effect on the murder rate, at least in 2007 and 
2008. Furthermore, the likelihood of being arrested, given a 
death sentence, or executed really has no effect on the murder 
rate whatsoever for that same time period. What is interesting 
to note however is that it appears that socio-economic 
factors such as the unemployment rate have a large effect on 
determining the murder rate as people who are unemployed 
have a lowered opportunity cost of committing such crimes. 
This project could easily be expanded and improved by 
lengthening the time period from which data was collected or 
employing panel data as other studies have done. Additionally 
using more advanced regression techniques such as a two or 
three stage least squares regression technique and adding 
more control variables to account for the other socio-economic 
factors which surely impact the murder rates would likely 
improve the results. Furthermore, employing such techniques 
could help deal with some of the endogeneity that could be 
present.
While it would be incredibly presumptuous of me to claim that 
any changes in policy will, or should, come from this study, 
the results presented here do make the argument that we 
need to reevaluate the continued use of the death penalty in 
this country. Studies done on the supposed deterrent effect 
of capital punishment have been far from conclusive and thus 
due to the moral and ethical issues that surround the ending 
of another person’s life it seems necessary to be 100% certain 
that capital punishment is having the intended effect. Until a 
consensus can be reached to that effect it seems prudent to 
once again call for a moratorium on the penalty as was done 
back in the 1970s or remove the penalty altogether, an option 
many states are opting for. 
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Table 1: Variables & Expected Signs 
Variable Definition Expected Sign 
Dependant Variable   
Murder Rate/100,000 Residents  N/A 
Deterrent Variables   
Ratio of Arrests to Homicides Arrests/Homicides - 
Ratio of Death Sentences to 
Arrests 
DS/Arrests - 
Ratio of Executions to Death 
Sentences 
Executions/DS - 
Control Variables   
Unemployment Average Annual % of 
Unemployed Workers 
+ 
LE per Cap # of Law Enforcement Officers per 
Capita 
- 
Dummy Variable    
2008 1 if 2008 or 0 if 2007 N/A 
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Table A: Regression Results 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Constant 5.518 *** 
(8.735) 
5.608 *** 
(8.431) 
8.767*** 
(5.817) 
Arrests/Homicide Ratio -1.537* 
(-1.980) 
-1.517* 
(-1.943) 
-.840 
(-1.271) 
Death Sentences/Arrest Ratio 1.814 
(.181) 
2.138 
(.211) 
1.522 
(.181) 
Executions/Death Sentence 
Ratio 
.647 
(.094) 
.546 
(.079) 
5.172 
(.903) 
2008 N/a -.213 
(-.450) 
-.858** 
(-1.989) 
LEPerCap N/a N/a -.020*** 
(-6.033) 
Unemployment PerCap N/a N/a 59.831*** 
(-6.033) 
Adjusted R² .011 .003 .329 
Durbin Watson Statistic  2.543 2.551 2.429 
* Significance at the .1 level ** Significance at the .05 level *** Significance at the .01 level   

